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In response to an increasing concern for the impact of illegal aliens
on the United States economy,' several congressmen have proposed leg-
islation which would establish criminal penalties for any employer who
knowingly hired illegal aliens. 2 The proposals to impose criminal liabil-
ity on employers who knowingly employ illegal aliens are motivated by
the belief that the primary incentive for illegal aliens to enter the United
States is the availability of jobs which pay significantly higher wages
I [T]here are growing indications, in public opinion polls and in angry letters from
constituents, that many Americans, convinced that immigrants are taking their jobs,
draining the treasury and dividing cities into isolated and increasingly hostile ethnic
communities, are demanding a solution. One recent poll by the Roper Organization
showed that nine of ten of those surveyed supported an "all-out effort" to halt illegal
immigration ....
N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1980, § 1, at 1, col. 1. See also What IllegalAliens Cost the Economy, Bus.
WEEK, June 13, 1977, at 87. The article suggested that:
Because of illegal workers, the unemployment figures are significantly higher than they
would otherwise be. It is impossible for the U.S. to provide jobs for the whole world's
unemployed, but because it is the richest and freest of the large economies, the country is
drawing them in increasing numbers.
Id
2 The first proposals to establish criminal penalties for the knowing employment of illegal
aliens were made by Congressman Rodino in 1972 and 1975. Neither bill was passed. In
1975 Senator Kennedy proposed a bill which limited sanctions for hiring to civil penalties.
Senator Eastland backed a similar bill in 1976, and in 1977 the Carter Administration advo-
cated legislation which would create an initial civil penalty followed by an injunctive remedy
for "pattern or practice" of employing illegal aliens. The Kennedy, Eastland, and Carter
proposals all failed. Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, Enforcement
Decision Memo No. 1, app. C (Dec. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Enforcement Decision Memo
No. 1]. In 1979 the following bill was proposed:
Any person who employs an alien and who knows that the alien is not permitted to be
employed in the United States shall be fined not less than $1,000 and not more than
$25,000, or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both, for each alien so employed.
H.R. 2213, § 5, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). A similar proposal was made in the Senate in
1980. Huddleston Amendment to S. 1763, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reporltedin S. REP. No.
96-859, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
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than the jobs available in their home countries.3 The proposed legisla-
tion attempts to eliminate this incentive by making these jobs unavaila-
ble. Currently, an employer faces no civil or criminal penalty for hiring
illegal aliens.4
In order to enforce the proposed legislation fairly,5 and to give ef-
fect to the knowledge requirement which would be included in the law,6
commentators have suggested that the government should require all
legally employable persons (citizens and legally resident aliens) to carry
work authorization cards.7 The Select Commission on Immigration and
Refugee Policy endorsed the establishment of a more secure method of
identification for citizens and legal aliens on February 26, 1981.8 Work
3 The arguments for the adoption of an employee eligibility/employer responsibility
law, including a secure means of identifying eligible employees, are based on the conclu-
sion that as long as no credible deterrent exists, ambitious men and women will spend a
lifetime of savings and take great personal risks to find work in the United States. With-
out the deterrent of an employee eligibility/employer responsibility system, enforcement
will rest on ineffective border vigilance and difficult interior apprehensions, that are cost-
inefficient, sometimes inhumane and do not discourage illegal entry.
Enforcement Decision Memo No. 1, supra note 2, at 2.
In 1978, the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy was created by Pub.
L. 95-412, § 4, 92 Stat. 907 (1978). Its purpose is "to study and evaluate, . . . existing laws,
policies, and procedures governing the admission of immigrants and refugees to the United
States and to make such administrative and legislative recommendations to the President and
to the Congress as are appropriate." Id § 4(c). The Enforcement Decision Memo is a staff
recommendation.
4 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (Supp. II 1978). This provision of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 exempts employers from prosecution under the section of the act which makes
harboring illegal aliens a crime. There is one law which prohibits employers from hiring
undocumented aliens, the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act of 1963, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 2041-53 (1976):
This law makes it illegal for contractors or farmers knowingly to employ undocumented
aliens on their work crews, and requires those who do hire migrant workers to be certified
by the federal government. Sanctions against employers who violate the Act include
suspension of, and refusal to renew certification; the assessment of civil penalties of up to
$1,000 for each violation; and referral for criminal action.
Enforcement Decision memo No. I, supra note 2, at 1. This Act has not been an effective
deterrent to illegal immigration.
5 See text accompanying notes 42-48 infra. The proposed legislation would simply impose
criminal sanctions on employers who knowingly hired illegal aliens. The current bills give an
employer no way to check the immigration status of job applicants. Such a law, without
more, would encourage discrimination by employers. An employer could justify his refusal to
hire any Hispanic or Oriental person with the argument that he believed the job applicant to
be an illegal immigrant.
6 See note 2 supra. If the proposed legislation was enacted as it standsinow, and employers
were prohibited from making the defense that they had refused to hire certain job applicants
because they thought the applicants might be illegal immigrants, then employers would be
compelled to hire all job applicants regardless of whether they looked or talked as though
they might be illegal aliens. This would render the provision of the proposed legislation creat-
ing criminal liability for the knowing employment of illegal aliens meaningless.
7 See text accompanying notes 49-50 infra.
8 The staff of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy made a recom-
mendation in early December 1980 for
implementation of an employee eligibility/employer responsibility system based on a
counterfeit-resistant card . . ., to be implemented in three stages: . . .
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authorization cards would probably bear a numerical identifier or the
holder's social security number, in addition to name, date of birth, sex,
and photograph. 9
Congress has never before proposed that American citizens be
forced to carry identification cards in order to exercise a fundamental
right such as work. The concept of a work authorization card is diamet-
rically opposed to the concepts of informational privacy and freedom
from searches and seizures. Proponents of the work authorization card
argue that the need to stem the flood of illegal aliens into this country is
sufficiently important that a work authorization card used in a way sim-
ilar to a social security number or a driver's license should not be found
unconstitutional. Examination of the issues, however, shows that a work
authorization card could impose burdens on citizens' rights to privacy
significantly greater than those now imposed by the social security
number and driver's license. Given this possibility, the need to discour-
age illegal aliens from entering the United States is perhaps not suffi-
ciently important to warrant the establishment of a work authorization
card.
Section I of this comment evaluates the impact of illegal aliens on
the United States economy and assesses the need to reduce the flow of
immigrants into the United States. Subsequent sections of the comment
weigh this need against the detrimental effects a work authorization
card can be expected to have on fundamental rights. An outline of the
current proposals for the work authorization card is presented in Section
II. Section III analyzes the effect of the proposed work authorization
card on the permissible scope of searches and seizures in the workplace,
and Section IV examines the potential effects of the work authorization
card on informational rights of privacy and the government's ability to
B. A second-phase based on a counterfeit-resistant work authorization card for certain
age groups; and
C. Eventual implementation of the work authorization card system for the entire labor
force.
Enforcement Decision Memo No. 1, supra note 2, at ii. The final report of the Commission
was issued February 26, 1981. The final report of the Commission made several key recom-
mendations including imposition of penalties on employers who make a practice of hiring
illegal aliens and the establishment of a more secure method of identification for citizens and
legal aliens. Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, U.S. Immigration Pol-
icy and National Interest, (Final Report, February 26, 1981), discussed in Now Up for Debate, a
Chain of Proposals on Illegal Aliens, N.Y. Times, March 1, 1981, § 4, at E3, col. 1. Although the
Commission did not endorse a national identification card system, nearly the entire Commis-
sion agreed on the need for some secure identification system. See Editorial, Immigration and the
Missing Nail, N.Y. Times, March -l, 1981, § 4, at E18, col. 1. Congress will act on these
proposals in the future.
9 Enforcement Decision Memo No. 1, p. 8.
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collect and assemble information in data banks. Section V concludes
the comment.
I. IMPACT OF ILLEGAL ALIENS ON THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY
Although the proposals to establish criminal penalties for the know-
ing employment of illegal aliens are based on the belief that the presence
of illegal aliens in this country creates a burden on the nation's econ-
omy,10 that conclusion is not clearly borne out by the statistics devel-
oped by researchers in the area. I I In order to gauge the need for the
proposed legislation, the impact of illegal aliens on the U.S. economy
must be realistically assessed.
According to classical economics, immigration is generally benefi-
cial to an economy in that "it increases the supply of the available labor
and therefore makes labor cheaper, product prices lower, and employ-
ment greater. In this simple view, immigration promotes profits, eco-
nomic growth, and general prosperity, with possible excessive demands
for social capital formation (schools, hospitals, housing) .... -,2 This
benign view of immigration is inapplicable to an economy with a high
unemployment rate. Some theorists believe that in an economy with
significant unemployment, immigrants only substitute for native work-
ers in jobs which the native workers could perform with equal effi-
ciency.1 3 Thus, in an economy with high unemployment,
wages and prices are not lowered by immigration. In this situation, immi-
grants impose only costs on the economy. This economic burden is borne
by the displaced native workers and by society generally to the extent that
displaced native workers and their families are supported by the public
social welfare programs. Moreover, immigrants themselves use social serv-
ices, but that is also true under full employment.
14
The displacement view of immigration may not be accurate.
10 See notes 1 & 3 supra.
11 Generally speaking, the statement is correct that severe economic competition or
severe and widespread displacement has not been proven. But neither has the opposite
been proven .... The staff of the [Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee
Policy] has almost concluded that the economics debate is fruitless because the evidence
on both sides of that debate is incomplete, and none of it is terribly persuasive in the
aggregate.
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, SHOULD U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY BE CHANGED? 6
(June 2, 1980) (statement of Exec. Dir. Lawrence H. Fuchs, Select Comm'n on Immigration
& Refugee Pol'y).
12 Fogel, IllegalAliens: Economic Aspects and Public Policy Alternatives, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
63, 67 (1977). Fogel's analysis is correct in the short run. Over the long run, however,.ex-
tended periods of immigration could create high rates of growth in the population and GNP
and put excessive strain on the nation's resources and environment. See also R. LECOMBER,
ECONOMIC GROWTH VERSUS THE ENVIRONMENT (1975).
13 Fogel, sufra note 12, at 67.
14 Id at 68.
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M.I.T. economist Michael J. Piore has advanced the thesis that illegal
aliens may be taking jobs which are unwanted by American workers. 15
These jobs have been described as secondary because of low-skill re-
quirements, low wages, and resulting low status.16
Piore contends that adult native workers consistently reject these
secondary jobs because of their low status and the lack of career ad-
vancement opportunity accompanying them. He posits that these same
jobs are sought by migrant workers from poor rural communities.' 7 To
the extent that these secondary jobs are essential to the growth of an
industrial economy, a large flow of immigrants into the United States
may be necessary to support continued economic development. Thus,
legislation which proposes to criminalize the employment of illegal
aliens is not only unnecessary, but to the extent that it causes vital secon-
dary jobs to go unfilled, detrimental to the economy. Underlying Pi-
ore's theory is the premise that even in times of high unemployment,
illegal immigrants do not displace American workers, but instead take
jobs that those legally entitled to work would not want anyway.
This analysis, however, fails to consider the indirect, detrimental
effect of an illegal alien work force on the bargaining strength of unions
and on the minimum wage and hour provisions enacted by Congress.
The continual supply of illegal aliens, ready to work at any job which
pays better than a job in their home countries, enables many employers
to ignore labor statutes. 18 Any illegal immigrant unwilling to accept the
wages and working conditions offered by his employer will quit rather
than report a wage law violation to authorities. Since he can always be
replaced by another, an illegal alien has no bargaining power to negoti-
ate better terms of employment. Furthermore, their illegal status ren-
ders illegal aliens powerless to seek enforcement of standards established
by national and state legislation for worker representation, minimum
wages, hours of work, social security, and safety.' 9 "They fear that any
contract with an enforcement agency is likely to result in deportation;
either the agency or their employer is likely to report them to the Immi-
15 Piore, Impact ofImmigration on the Labor Force, MoNTHiLY LAB. REV. May 1975, at 41-43,
reprinted in AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, ILLEGAL ALIENS: PROBLEMS AND POLICIES
13 (1978). [hereinafter cited as AEI REPORT].
16 AEI REPORT, supra note 15, at 7.
17 Adult native workers in any industrialized society tend regularly to reject secondary
jobs because of low social status and the instability and lack of career opportunity which
they carry. These jobs, however, tend to carry much higher relative status in the social
structures of rural agricultural communities. That and the fact that rural workers who
migrate to urban areas generally expect to stay only temporarily and are therefore less
interested in career opportunity and work stability make migrants an attractive source of
labor for the secondary sector and they are recruited for that purpose.
Piore, supra note 15, at 41-43, reprinted in AEI REPORT, supra note 15, at 13.




gration and Naturalization Service." '20
Lack of compliance with labor laws is rarely limited to one em-
ployer in any given industry. Although "[o]ther firms in secondary mar-
kets may attempt to comply with labor laws, . . . competition from
firms which willingly violate the law makes compliance difficult."
'2
'
Once one employer is able to cut costs significantly by violating the la-
bor laws, other employers in the same industry may be forced to violate
the labor laws in order to compete. If any of the employers in the af-
fected industry hire native Americans, those workers will also suffer a
decline in the quality of their working conditions.
22
Another argument is that "illegal aliens burden social programs
such as those offering welfare, food stamps, and medical assistance and
that taxpayers bear the expense."' 23 Some studies, however, have found
that illegal aliens contribute to the welfare system through certain taxes.
Insofar as illegals are bona fide employees of bona fide employers, as a
substantial percentage of the respondents were, they are making substan-
tial tax contributions in the form of withholding taxes, in addition to
whatever other tax contributions are automatic (e.g., sales taxes) which
illegals pay in their role as consumer.24
Illegal aliens may not participate directly in public assistance programs,
because they tend to be economically motivated and because participa-
tion would increase the risk of detection by the authorities who would
20 Id Similarly, "[f]ear of retaliation by their employer culminating in a rather short-
lived job also causes aliens to avoid unionization." Id
21 Id
22 Employees in those industries which produce substitutes for the goods produced by
noncomplying employers will also be adversely affected by an employer who cuts costs by
failing to comply with labor laws because a decrease in the price of the illegally produced
commodity will decrease the quantity demanded of a good for which it is a substitute. Al-
though the employees in substitute industries may not be forced to work under conditions
which violate the labor laws, they may instead be forced out of work because of competition
from lower priced goods made by cheaper, illegal alien labor.
23 AEI REPORT, supra note 15, at 14.
24 D. NORTH & M. HOUSTOUN, THE CHARACTERISTICS AND ROLE OF ILLEGAL ALIENS
IN THE U.S. LABOR MARKET 142 (1976), reprinted in AEI REPORT, supra note 15, at 16. The
North and Houstoun study also points out that the percent of illegals who contribute to social
services is much higher than is the percent of aliens who withdraw funds from the programs.
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deport them. 25 Nonetheless, to the extent that illegal aliens displace na-
tives from their jobs and cause displaced citizens to seek public assist-
ance, they burden social programs indirectly.26 Opinions vary as to the
net impact of illegal aliens on social assistance programs in the United
States. The information currently available is insufficient to determine
whether they are a net cost or a net benefit to the system.27
The money which illegal aliens send to their dependents in home
countries is also a concern of economists. 28 Although the number of dol-
lars sent out of the United States is indeterminate, the annual figure
seems to be in the billions.29 This flow of funds has repercussions on
American international economic policy because it aggravates the al-





Social security taxes withheld ................................ 77.3
Federal income taxes withheld ................................ 73.2
Hospitalization payments withheld ............................ 44.0
Filed U.S. income tax returns ................................... 31.5
Output
Used hospitals or clinics ..................................... 27.4
Collected one or more weeks of unemployment
insurance ................................................ 3.9
Have children in U.S. schools ................................ 3.7
Participated in U.S.-funded job-training programs .............. 1.4
Secured food stamps ........................................ 1.3
Secured welfare payments .................................... 0.5
Id at 142, repfinted in AEI REPORT, supra note 15, at 16 (Table 6).
25 AEI REPORT, supra note 15, at 17. See also D. NORTH & M. HoUSTOUN, supra note 24,
at S-1 ff., reprinted in AEI REPORT, supra note 15, at 7. On the basis of a sample of 793
apprehended illegal aliens who were at least sixteen years old and who had worked for wages
in the United States for two weeks or more, North and Houstoun characterized the typical
illegal alien as (1) a young adult (78.1% were thirty-four years old or less); (2) male (90.8% of
the sample); (3) economically motivated (74.2% had come to the United States to get a job);
(4) supporting at least one relative or dependent in the country of origin (79.7%); (5) rela-
tively unskilled and uneducated with approximately half as much education as his counter-
part in the United States labor force (6.7 years as against 12.4 years of schooling); (6) less
likely to be married than his United States counterpart. AEI REPORT, supra note 15, at 7. To
the extent that these characteristics are typical of the illegal alien population in the United
States, that population is probably unlikely to require public aid.
26 COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, IMPACT OF ILLEGAL ALIENS ON
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: Too LITTLE IS KNOWN 3 (Report to the Senate Comm. on
the Budget, Dec. 1, 1977), reprinted in AEI REPORT, supra note 15, at 15.
27 Id at 14, reprinted in AEI REPORT, supra note 15, at 16.
28 Salinas & Torres, The Undocumented Mexican Alien: A Legal, Social and Economic Anal sir,
13 Hous. L. REV. 863, 876 (1976).
29 AEI REPORT, supra note 15, at 18.
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ready unfavorable balance of payments of the United States. 30 On the
other hand, funds sent abroad this way are a form of disguised foreign
aid, a sudden halt to which could have undesirable repercussions, partic-
ularly for our diplomatic relationship with Mexico.
3 1
The impact of illegal aliens on the American economy is ambigu-
ous. Clearly, they work for wages and under conditions inferior to those
demanded by native workers. Yet studies have failed to demonstrate
whether illegal aliens are displacing legitimate American workers from
jobs, or are working in jobs which few Americans would want to take
anyway. Similarly, the experts have failed to agree on the extent to
which illegal aliens burden the public assistance programs of the United
States. Moreover, the money sent home by illegal aliens, although dam-
aging to our balance of payments, may be beneficial to diplomatic rela-
tions as a form of foreign aid.
II. CURRENT LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
Despite this uncertainty, members of Congress have proposed legis-
lation such as H.R. 2213 and the Huddleston Amendment to S. 1763.32
The purpose of the proposals is to eliminate the employment incentive
which draws aliens to this country.3 3 Currently, an employer has no risk
of liability for hiring illegal aliens.34 The proposed legislation would
establish criminal sanctions for an employer who knowingly hires illegal
aliens. In theory, these sanctions will discourage an employer from hir-
ing any illegal alien. Although such legislation has never been enacted
on a federal level, California and Kansas have statutes which establish
30 Id
31 Id
State [Department] officials warn that for some of the most important countries of
origin, such as Mexico, the shock of simultaneously losing the money that most aliens
send home and of also having to re-integrate them into their slow-growing economies
would be sure to worsen diplomatic relations with the U.S. and might heighten their
social and political instability. Furthermore, many private organizations, most notably
the Catholic Church and interested ethnic groups such as the Chicano "La Raza" argue
vigorously that such a massive upheaval would be repugnant on humanitarian grounds.
What Illegal Aliens Cost the Economy, supra note 1, at 87.
32 H.R. 2213, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Huddleston Amendment to S. 1763, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). See note 2 supra.
33 See note 3 supra. See also Comment, IllegalAliens and Enforcement, 8 U.C. DAVIs L. REv.
127 (1975).
INS and local police enforcement of immigration laws with its emphasis upon detecting
and apprehending individual illegal aliens, has not and will not have more than minimal
effect on reducing the volume of illegal entrants. The most effective method of solving
the problem is to take profit out of illegal immigration by minimizing the employment
opportunities available to illegal aliens in the United States.
Id at 152.
34 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (Supp. 11 1978). See note 4 supra.
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criminal penalties for the knowing employment of illegal aliens. 35
In 1976, a case challenging the California statute was considered by
the Supreme Court.3 6 The Court's treatment of that case indicates a
predisposition toward statutes which attempt to discourage the influx of
illegal aliens by imposing criminal penalties on their employers. In De-
Canas v. Bica, migrant farm workers who were legal residents of the
United States brought an action against farm labor contractors pursu-
ant to the provision of the California code which criminalizes the know-
ing employment of aliens not lawfully admitted to residence in the
United States.37 The defendants argued that the statute was unconstitu-
tional. The Supreme Court of the United States upheld the statute. Af-
ter making a determination that the statute was not pre-empted, 38 the
Court approved the statute as an exercise of the state's police power.
The Court referred to the broad authority possessed by the state to "reg-
ulate the employment relationship to protect workers within the State,"
and cited child labor laws, minimum wage laws, occupational health
and safety laws, and workmen's compensation laws as examples of that
police power.39 Because the employment of illegal aliens might deprive
citizens and lawfully admitted aliens of jobs, and acceptance by illegal
aliens of jobs with substandard wages and working conditions can de-
press wages and working conditions for the whole work force, the Court
held that the California law prohibiting the knowing employment of
illegal aliens was well within the state's police power to regulate the em-
ployment relationship. 4° Thus, the Supreme Court gave explicit ap-
proval to a statute which criminalized the knowing employment of
illegal aliens. The Court perceived the statute as a legitimate exercise of
the state's police power,41 and would probably be inclined to uphold a
35 CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805 (West Supp. 1978), states:
(a) No employer shall knowingly employ an alien who is not entitled to lawful resi-
dence in the United States if such employment would have an adverse effect on lawful
resident workers.
(b) A person found guilty of a violation of subdivision (a) is punishable by a fine of not
less than two hundred dollars ($200) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500) for each
offense.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4409(b) (1978), states that: "Knowingly employing an alien illegally
within the territory of the United States shall be a Class C misdemeanor."
36 DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
37 Id at 353.
38 IT]he Court has never held that every state enactment which in any way deals with
aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus pre-empted by this constitutional power,
whether latent or exercised. . . . [E]ven if such local regulation has some purely specu-
lative and indirect impact on immigration, it does not thereby become a constitutionally
proscribed regulation of immigration. ...
Id at 355-56.
39 Id at 356.
40 Id at 357.
41 The Court neglected, however, to consider the impact of the California law on other
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federal statute on the same grounds.
Yet DeCanas v. Bica fails to consider the potential for discrimination
which might arise under the proposed legislation if it is enacted in its
present form.42 The current proposals would impose liability on the em-
ployer who knowing.'y hires illegal immigrants, but would give employers
no standards by which to distinguish those job applicants who are illegal
immigrants from those legally entitled to work. A cautious employer
will refuse to hire any job applicant who might be an illegal alien. An
applicant with a Latino or Oriental appearance, or who is unable to
speak English well, will be vulnerable to rejection by an employer who
suspects that the applicant might be an illegal immigrant even though
the applicant might be legally entitled to work.43 Thus, the law could
become a tool for employers to legitimize discrimination against Chica-
nos, other Latinos, and Asian-Americans who are United States citizens
or legal immigrants. In this way, the effect of the proposals in their
current form would be to aggravate the unemployment problems of
groups already suffering severe unemployment. 44
Furthermore, an employer presumably would not be liable for fail-
ure to inquire into the legal status of some.one who did not appear to be
Hispanic or Oriental, or who had learned to speak English well. In
those cases, the employer could argue that he did not knowingly hire an
undocumented alien because he could not reasonably have determined
from appearances that the person was an illegal immigrant. 45 Thus the
application of the legislation in its present form would be flexible. An
employer would have reason to inquire into the status of some appli-
cants and not others.46 Flexibility is another aspect of the proposed leg-
islation which is susceptible to discriminatory abuses. To the extent that
the knowledge requirement could be met by proof that an employer
made a bona fide inquiry into the legal status of an employee, one com-
mentator has suggested that an employer could probably "make a
prima facie case of a bona fide inquiry by obtaining a signed writing
from the employee attesting to the employee's legal right to seek em-
states. Regulation of the employment of undocumented aliens requires a national, uniform
approach. "If California effectively enforces its law, how is Texas going to handle the influx
of undocumented workers? If Texas also enacts a law as a result of the unique effect of
undocumented workers on its economy, what state will be the next to suffer economically?"
Salinas & Torres, supra note 28, at 900. See also Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
42 See note 2 supra.
43 Salinas & Torres, supra note 28, at 910. Currently, the only deterrent to this kind of
employer discrimination against Americans of Hispanic descent would be Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976), which forbids discrimination on the
basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin. See Comment, supra note 33, at 158.
44 Salinas & Torres, supra note 28, at 910.
45 d at 912.
46 Id
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ployment. ' ' 47 Under these circumstances, the employer could continue
hiring illegal aliens simply by collecting signed attestations from all his
employees. 48
The logical solution to the problem of discrimination and the in-
centive for unscrupulous employers to collect meaningless forms signed
by illegal aliens attesting to their right to work is to require employers to
check identification papers of applicants before hiring them to work.
Yet critics argue that
An employer should not be held responsible for demanding the presenta-
tion of birth certificate, passport, alien registration receipt card, or other
documentation, and then attempt to determine from these documents if
the applicant for employment is legitimately in the United States. This
task should be reserved for the agencies responsible for regulating immi-
gration and the work force.4 9
Not only is expecting an employer to understand the various papers
which might establish a person's right to work in the United States un-
reasonable, but the ease with which illegal aliens can obtain forged doc-
uments would seriously undermine an enforcement program which
required an employer to check an applicant's papers. For these reasons,
commentators have proposed that legal aliens and U.S. citizens carry a
standard, non-duplicatable work authorization card.
A work authorization card has been justified as "[a]n effective iden-
tification system . . .[which] should make it substantially easier to lo-
cate illegal aliens without fear of harassing citizens or lawfully admitted
aliens. Presentation of the card would attest to employment status for
purposes of the mandatory employment application procedure. ' 50 In
order to minimize the possibility of counterfeit, the work authorization
card would be made of a plastic or other synthetic such as that used in
most state driver's licenses, and would bear a photograph of the holder.
The card would also display vital information about the holder5' and a
numerical identifier unique to the individual holder.52
47 Comment, supra note 33, at 156.
48 Id
49 Salinas & Torres, supra note 28, at 913.
50 Comment, supra note 33.
51 The counterfeit resistant card would carry the minimum information necessary to
identify the person: name, date of birth, sex, a photograph, and an identifying number
unique to the individual. Additional information (place of birth, mother's first name)
would also be maintained in a computer data base to help screen out imposters or per-
sons using a loaned card to establish eligibility.
Enforcement Decision Memo No. 1, supra note 2, at 8.
52 The Social Security Administration (SSA) has resisted conversion of the social security
number into a "standard universal identifier," with a more general purpose. The SSA offi-
cials point out that the social security number is currently not a very good identifier since the
SSA has been relatively lax in requiring identification prior to issuance of a number and
because of the SSA's willingness to change an individual's file name or number. A. WESTIN &
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Several commentators have made proposals for work authorization
card systems. The most specific has been formulated by the staff of the
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. The staff has recom-
mended that "[t]he initial employment eligibility system should be
based on a statement of eligibility filled out by all newly hired employ-
ees and filed by employers for screening with the [employee eligibil-
ity/employer responsibility] federal entity. a53 In the second phase of the
program, the staff recommends that the work authorization card system
should be established and applied in the first year to all job changers
M. BAKER, DATA BANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY: COMPUTERS, RECORD-KEEPING AND PRI-
VACY, 43 (1972). As a result, there are many individuals with two numbers, and possibly,
some numbers belonging to two individuals. SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AU-
TOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE,
RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 112 (1973) [hereinafter cited as HEW
REPORT]. Furthermore,
[t]he Administration also raises the issue of damage to its public image. The feeling of
many is that whether or not it actually administers a national identification program, the
concept of a universal identifier is so distasteful to many segments of the population that
public confidence in Social Security programs would be undermined.
A. WESTIN & M. BAKER, supra, at 44. The staff for the Commission on Immigration and
Refugee Policy has summarized the reasons for and against using the social security number
as the numerical identifier for work authorization cards.
Reasons for:
-The public has considerable experience with the social security card and/or number
and is more likely to be receptive to the extension of its use than to a completely new
employment eligibility card and system;
-A social security-type card is less likely to become an internal identifier than cards
with more information;...
-This system can be uniformly applied to all persons seeking employment and to all
employers;
-Using the social security number will provide, as a by-product, the basis for correcting
inaccurate Social Security Administration records; and
-These cards, without photographs, would not have to be reissued over time and need
only be replaced after lengthy use, loss or name change.
Reasons against: ...
-Even if the data base existed apart from the Social Security Administration (SSA), use
of the social security number would allow immediate tracing of personal information
between the two data bases;...
-Indirect costs to the SSA could be considerable if it had to merge its other processing
and its data base with this new responsibility; some new expense would be involved in
simply verifying social security numbers;
-A once-in-a-lifetime enrollment process produces a less satisfactory means of identify-
ing the bearer of the card. This could make an employer less confident of an appli-
cant's eligibility and result in some intentional and unintentional discrimination. It
could make identification more time-consuming for field investigators; and...
-The social security card is not as fraud resistant as [an eligibility card with the holder's
name, date of birth, sex, photograph and a different, unique numerical identifier].
Enforcement Decision Memo No. 1, supra note 2, at 11-12. The staff of the Commission on
Immigration and Refugee Policy recommended that the work authorization card system be
established apart from the Social Security System. Yet, whether the social security number or
some other numerical standard universal identifier is displayed on the work authorization
card, the implication for the informational rights of privacy for Americans will be the same.
See Section IV infla.
53 Enforcement Decision Memo No. 1, supra note 2, at 13.
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between the ages of eighteen to twenty and to all new entrants to the job
market; in the second year to all job changers between twenty and
twenty-two years of age and to all new entrants; until job changers of all
ages and all new entrants are covered by the system.54 The staff also
recommends that the work authorization card be used in conjunction
with a call-in or real-time access data bank system.55 The staff expects
that the implementation of these proposals would reduce the flow of
illegal immigration by as much as thirty percent in the first year. Once
the card-based system is applied to the labor force, "effectiveness could
increase to about ninety-five percent by the tenth or eleventh year of the
program. '5
6
The work authorization card, however, may not actually benefit
the American citizens and legal aliens who will be forced to carry it in
order to work. An application of the Supreme Court's treatment of the
driver's license5 7 and right to privacy 58 to the work authorization card
indicates that the card could impose significant new burdens on the free-
dom of American people and on their right to privacy.
III. DRIVER'S LICENSE CASES
Over the past decade, the Supreme Court has issued several opin-
ions on the authority of police to stop automobiles in order to check the
license of the driver and the validity of searches and seizures performed
pursuant to those stops. To the extent that the work authorization card
is analogous to the driver's license, the principles established in the
driver's license cases will be applicable to the work authorization card.
As a result, the establishment of a work authorization card could mean
that enforceable identification checks and valid searches and seizures in
the workplace will be possible when they never were before.
In 1973, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Robinson.59 In
that case, a police officer had lawfully arrested the respondent for oper-
ating a motor vehicle after revocation of his permit.60 The police officer
had observed the respondent driving, and as a result of a previous inves-
tigation following a check of respondent's operator's permit, had reason
to believe that the respondent was driving with a revoked permit. The
police officer then searched the respondent's person pursuant to police
54 Id
55 Id at 8. See text accompanying notes 91 & 92 infra.
56 Enforcement Decision Memo No. 1, supra note 2, at 15.
57 See text accompanying notes 59-90 infra.
58 See text accompanying notes 91-136 infra.
59 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
60 It is an offense defined by statute in Washington, D.C. for a driver to operate a motor




regulations. Although he was not motivated by a feeling of danger or
specifically looking for weapons, the police officer conducted a full body
search of the respondent. Inside a crumpled cigarette package found in
the breast pocket of the respondent's heavy coat, the police officer found
fourteen capsules containing heroin. The heroin was admitted into evi-
dence in the district court, resulting in respondent's conviction. The
Supreme Court upheld the validity of the search.
The Court's decision rested on the fact that a "lawful custodial ar-
rest" had been effected. 61 Both parties conceded that the arrest was law-
ful. Due to the police officer's previous investigation of the respondent's
permit several days earlier, he had probable cause to arrest the respon-
dent for driving after the revocation of his permit. 62 The Court charac-
terized the custodial arrest based on probable cause as a "reasonable
intrusion under the Fourth Amendment," and asserted that a full body
search conducted pursuant to a legitimate arrest was not so much more
intrusive under the fourth amendment that it needed additional justifi-
cation.63 In other words, the Court held that the authority to make the
arrest included the authority to undertake the less intrusive activity, the
full body search. The Court's opinion indicates that as long as the arrest
was lawful, a search conducted pursuant to that arrest would be upheld.
Moreover, the scope of the search need not be limited to a defensive
frisk by the arresting officer. The concept of a defensive frisk was estab-
lished in Terry v. Ohio .64 In Terry, the Court held that a police officer had
authority to conduct a reasonable search for weapons when "he has rea-
son to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individ-
ual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual
for a crime."'65 A protective search is defined as "a carefully limited
61 Id at 235.
62 Id at 220.
63 A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion
under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the ar-
rest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which estab-
lishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful, custodial arrest a
full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment, but is also a "reasonable" search under that Amendment.
Id at 235.
64 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
65 Id at 27. The Teny court weighed the intrusion of the individual against "the govern-
mental interest in investigating the crime" and the "more immediate interest" of the police-
man's safety and concluded that:
Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude
in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous; where in the course of inves-
tigating this behavior he identifies himself as a police officer and makes reasonable in-
quiries; and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel this
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself
and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search. . . . [A]ny weapons seized
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search of the outer clothing . . . in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him."'66 In Tery, the Court permitted a
police officer only tofisk a detained suspect on the basis of the police
officer's apprehension that the suspect might be armed and dangerous.
Yet in Robinson, despite the fact that the arrest was not based on
any suspicion that Robinson had been involved in a violent crime and
that the arresting officer conceded that he had no feeling of danger and
was not looking for weapons, the Court upheld the full body search.
The author of the majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist, distinguished
Terry on the grounds that in Robinson the search was conducted pursuant
to a lawful arrest, whereas in Terry there had been no arrest. 67 This
distinction is not persuasive. The search was limited in Terry because
there had been no probable cause for arrest. Similarly, in Robinson
where the respondent was arrested merely for driving with an invalid
license, the police officer had no cause to suspect that the respondent
carried a gun or was involved in any other crime. Yet the Court stated
that "the standards traditionally governing a search incident to lawful
arrest are not. . . commuted to the stricter Terry standards by the ab-
sence of probable fruits or further evidence of the particular crime for
which the arrest is made."68
Regardless of the basis for the arrest, or the harmlessness of the
suspect, the fact that the arrest is lawful gives police the authority to
conduct a full body search. Under this analysis, a more intrusive search
could be made of an individual arrested for simply driving with an im-
proper license than could be made of an individual suspected of being
armed and dangerous whom police lacked probable cause to arrest.
Robinson may dictate a similar lack of constraints for searches of a person
arrested for working with an invalid work authorization card. Applied
to the work authorization card, the Robinson analysis may give police the
impetus to extend their search of temporarily detained persons beyond
the limits set by Terry. Under Robinson police could, by arresting sus-




67 414 U.S. at 227. "Teny. . . affords no basis to carry over to a probable-cause arrest the
limitations this court placed on a stop-and-frisk search permissible without probable cause."
id
68 Id at 234. The Court noted that "30% of the shootings of police officers occur when an
officer stops an automobile." Id at 234 n.5. Thus it rejected the argument that the search of
a person arrested for driving with a revoked license should be limited in scope because such
persons are less likely to possess weapons than those arrested for other crimes. Id. at 234. But
in a dissenting opinion Justice Marshall argued that "virtually all of the killings are caused by
guns and knives, the very type of weapon which will not go undetected in a properly con-
ducted weapons frisk." Id at 255 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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pects working with invalid cards, make full body searches of those sus-
pected of committing other crimes despite the lack of probable cause to
arrest. Today, police can conduct full body searches only if they have
probable cause to arrest, and can only frisk a suspect if he is believed to
be armed and dangerous.
A second issue arises with respect to the scope of the search. In
Robinson, the Court invoked the well settled rule that:
A search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the war-
rant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. This general exception has
historically been formulated into two distinct propositions. The first is
that a search may be made of the person of the arrestee by virtue of the
lawful arrest. The second is that a search may be made of the area within
the control of the arrestee. 69
In Robinson, the Court's decision did not touch the issue of the "area
within the control of the arrestee." 70 The Court's reference to this well
settled rule leaves little doubt that if an employee were arrested at work
for failure to have a proper work authorization card on his person, the
work area could also be searched to some extent. No search of the work
area could occur today without a valid search warrant. 7' The work au-
thorization card could thus alter workers' expectations of privacy dra-
matically.
In a companion case to Robinson, Gustafson v. Florida,72 the Court
held that a full body search, conducted pursuant to an arrest made be-
cause the petitioner did not have his driver's license with him when he
was driving, was reasonable under the fourth amendment 73 despite the
fact that Gustafson later produced a valid driver's license. In the
driver's license cases, the state's power to arrest is based on the impor-
tant interest of highway safety.7 4 Those who have not complied with
69 414 U.S. at 218 (emphasis in original).
70 See, e.g., Dell v. State, 468 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1972), cerl. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973). In
Dell, the Court upheld the seizure of evidence found, pursuant to lawful arrest, on the floor-
board and rear floorboard of the defendant's car. Immigration and Naturalization Service
officials may not search a work place without a search warrant. 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (1976). See
also Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
71 In 1978, the Court held that warrantless searches to enforce the Occupational Safety
and Health Act (OSHA) were not permissible under the fourth amendment with the general
statement that "fw]arrantless searches are generally unreasonable ... this rule applies to
commercial premises as well as homes." Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. at 311.
A future Supreme Court might not find Marshall v. Barlow's persuasive in the work
authorization card context. The Court limited its holding to "the facts and law concerned
with OSHA." Id at 322. In the enforcement of other regulatory schemes, "[t]he reasonable-
ness of a warrantless search ... will depend upon the specific enforcement needs and privacy
guarantees of each statute." Id at 321.
72 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
73 Id at 265.
74 "[T]he states have a vital interest in ensuring that only those qualified to do so are
permitted to operate motor vehicles, that these vehicles are fit for safe operation and hence
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the licensing procedures are subject to arrest by the state, including
those caught driving without a proper license on their person. In De-
Canas v. Bica,75 the Court recognized the importance of protecting the
economy and reserving jobs for Americans legally entitled to them.76
Surely the Court would find this economic interest as important as high-
way safety. Following Gustafson, the state is presumably entitled to ar-
rest those caught working without a work authorization card on their
person. Under Robinson, if the arrest is lawful, a valid search could be
made pursuant to it.77 Not only would those carrying invalid cards be
vulnerable to full body searches, but under Gustafson, those who mis-
placed or forgot to carry their cards would also be vulnerable.
In Delaware v. Prouse ,78 the Court seemed to limit United States v.
Robinson and Gustafson v. Florida. The Prouse decision focused on the issue
of when a police officer could make a valid request to check a driver's
operator's license. In both Robinson and Gustafson, the police officer had
probable cause to make the arrest.79 Yet, often a police officer stops a
car to check the driver's license with no probable cause.80 In Prouse, a
patrolman, not acting pursuant to any standards promulgated by either
his department or the state, made a random stop of the respondent's
vehicle for the purpose of checking the driver's license and the car's re-
gistration, without having observed any traffic or equipment violations,
or suspicious activity. The patrolman seized marijuana in plain view on
the floor and the respondent was subsequently indicted for illegal posses-
sion.
The Supreme Court held that the search was unreasonable under
the fourth amendment. It reached this result by balancing the individ-
ual's right to privacy against the state interest of highway safety.81 The
Court recognized the importance of the state interest in highway
that licensing, registration and vehicle inspection requirements are being observed." Dela-
ware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 650 (1978).
75 424 U.S. 351.
76 Id at 356-57. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
77 414 U.S. at 265.
78 440 U.S. 648 (1979). See Note, Fourth Amendment Reasonable Expectations of Privuay in Auto-
mobile Searches, 70 J. CRIM. L. & C. 498 (1979).
79 In Robinson, the officer had checked Robinson's license four days previously and had
determined that Robinson's operator's permit had been revoked. When the police officer saw
Robinson driving again, he arrested him. 414 U.S. at 220. In Gustafson, the petitioner had
been driving recklessly. Thus, the officer had cause to stop him and request identification.
414 U.S. at 262.
80 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (police made random stop of vehicle in order to check
driver's license and car's registration); U.S. v. Millar, 543 F.2d 1280 (10th Cir. 1976) (police
had set up road block for the purpose of checking driver's license and vehicle registrations);
Keziah v. Bostic, 452 F. Supp. 912 (W.D.N.C. 1978) (patrolman, on a hunch, followed peti-
tioner's car into private driveway and requested to see driver's license).
81 440 U.S. at 548.
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safety,82 yet it stated that "an individual operating or travelling in an
automobile does not lose all reasonable expectation of privacy simply
because the automobile and its use are subject to government regula-
tion. Automobile travel is a basic, pervasive and often necessary mode
of transportation .... "83 The Court concluded that this privacy inter-
est outweighs the benefit which might accrue to the state in the form of
improved highway safety from a random check, and held that the incre-
mental contribution to highway safety made by the random check was
not sufficient to justify the practice under the fourth amendment.8 4 The
Court's decision was based to a large extent on the state's use of other
mechanisms to ensure highway safety. These included: (1) periodic is-
suance of operator's licenses, with renewal requiring familiarity with the
rules of the road; (2) vehicle registration requirements; (3) annual vehi-
cle inspection; (4) minimum insurance requirements. 85
Yet Prouse would provide, at best, a weak defense for an employee
trying to resist a random check of his work authorization card by the
authorities. In Prouse, the Court applied a balancing test and concluded
that with respect to random checks, the individual's privacy interest out-
weighed the state interest in highway safety. A distinction should be
made between an invalid driver's license and an improper work authori-
zation card. Usually, a driver operating a motor vehicle without a valid
driver's license has not actually violated any part of the state interest of
highway safety; but a worker with an improper work authorization card
would probably be a person not legally entitled to work in the United
States and thus would be directly violating the state interest of reserving
American jobs for citizens and legal aliens. Hence, the state interest in
random checks of work authorization cards might have sufficient magni-
tude to outweigh the individual's privacy interest.
Furthermore, because alternative mechanisms for promoting high-
way safety were available to the state, the Prouse Court gave less weight
to the state's interest in using random vehicle checks. If, however, the
work authorization card is adopted, the government may not have a
viable alternative to the random check for policing employers prohib-
ited from hiring illegal aliens. The only way to enforce such a law might
be to check each employee's work authorization card. An element of
surprise might be integral to this type of check.86 The language of Prouse
82 Id, See note 74 supra.
83 Id at 662.
84 Id at 658.
85 Id
86 In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. at 321-22, the Court indicated that its holding
requiring a search warrant for OSHA inspection did not mean that warrantless search provi-
sions in other regulatory schemes would be found unconstitutional. Rather, the Court sug-
gested that for each statute it would weigh enforcement needs against privacy guarantees.
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does not rule out that kind of procedure where there are no alternative
means of enforcement.
The Court also indicated that its holding in Prouse "does not pre-
clude. . states from developing methods for spot checking that involve
less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discre-
tion."'8 7 This qualification implies that nondiscretionary mechanisms
for spot checking driver's licenses, such as a roadblock or stopping every
sixth car, would be acceptable to the Supreme Court. 88 The Prouse
Court would not require a state to have probable cause in order to stop
the driver of a motor vehicle to check his license. Similarly, Prouse
would permit spot checks of work authorization cards without probable
cause as long as these checks were not discretionary on the part of the
police officer.89 Thus, the full body search of Robinson could be con-
ducted even when a nondiscretionary spot check had been used to deter-
mine that a worker was not carrying his card. Under Prouse, this highly
intrusive search can be made of a worker who was never suspected of
any violation. Thus, the work authorization card could become an ex-
traordinary tool for harassment.
The application of Robinson, Gustafson, and Prouse to the work au-
thorization card proposals is intimidating. These cases define the law on
87 440 U.S. at 663. The Court's criticism of the "unconstrained exercise of discretion" in
Prouse should be contrasted with the Court's statement in Robinson that:
A police officer's determination as to how and where to search the person of a suspect
whom he has arrested is necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amend-
ment does not require to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of each step of
the search.
414 U.S. at 235. The conflict between these two statements creates some uncertainty as to the
Court's attitude toward a police officer's use of discretion in searches and seizures.
88 Proust did not define any standards for a legitimate nondiscretionary check, but the
Court considered similar issues in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). In Brown, two police
officers stopped the appellant because he looked suspicious and they had never seen him
before in the area. They did not, however, suspect appellant of any specific misconduct or of
being armed. When the appellant refused to identify himself, the officers arrested him for
violation of a Texas statute which makes it a criminal act for a person to refuse to give his
name and address to an officer who had lawfully stopped him and requested the information.
Id at 49.
The Court found the seizure of the appellant to be unlawful under the fourth amend-
ment: "[T]he Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure must be based on specific, objective
facts indicating that society's legitimate interests require the seizure of the particular individ-
ual, or that seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limita-
tions on the conduct of individual officers." Id. at 51. Thus roadblocks or checking the driver
of every seventh car would probably be acceptable to the Court as "plans embodying neutral
limitations on the conduct of officers." See Note, supra note 78, at 509, for a series of sugges-
tions of what might constitute nondiscretionary stops.
89 Examples of nondiscretionary spot checks of work authorization cards might include
(a) checking the card of every worker in the factory, or (b) checking the card of every seventh
worker coming into the factory. Although such mechanisms would eliminate discretion with
respect to employees; such mechanisms would not limit the discretion used to determine
which workplaces to check.
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the only kind of identity card required of large numbers of people for
participation in a given activity. The gap between the driver's license
and the work authorization card is small. Although an argument can be
made that there is a fundamental right to work but not to drive and that
the two activities should therefore be distinguished, both activities are
subject to significant government regulation. As Prouse makes clear, the
power of the state to regulate driving is usually grounded on the state
interest in highway safety, for the protection of the travelling public.
Similarly, Congress promulgated the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
regulating wages and hours and prohibiting oppressive child labor, in
order to eliminate "labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of
the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and
general well-being of workers." 90 The work authorization card would
be justified as another means of maintaining this minimum standard of
living.
Furthermore, the cards would be facially similar to driver's licenses.
Both a driver's license and the proposed work authorization card would
bear similar information, including a photograph of the holder, his
name, sex, date of birth, and an identifying number. Both would be
issued to attest to the holder's right to participate in an activity which
the government has chosen to regulate. Thus, the Court could easily
analogize the established driver's license caselaw to work authorization
cards. Under that caselaw, establishment of the work authorization
card could make American workers vulnerable to searches and seizures
more intrusive than ever before. Given the uncertainty of the actual
impact of illegal aliens on the United States economy and the potential
for broader searches and seizures with the work authorization card, the
establishment of the card is difficult to justify.
90 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1938). The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19,
regulates wages and hours of employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods
and services for commerce and also prohibits oppressive child labor in activites related to such
commerce. The Act was upheld in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941):
The motive and the purpose of the present regulation are plainly to make effective the
congressional conception of public policy that interstate commerce should not be made
the instrument of competition in the distribution of goods produced under substandard
labor conditions. . . . [T]he motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce
are matters for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution
places no restriction and over which the courts are given no control.
Id at 115. Furthermore, sections 211 (a) and 212(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act give the
administrator of the Act or his delegates the power to investigate an employer and his records.
As with driving regulations, compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act is primarily en-
sured by inspection.
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IV. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AN INFORMATION RIGHT OF PRIVACY
AND THE WORK AUTHORIZATION CARD
The ramifications of a work authorization card extend beyond is-
sues of search and seizure, and raise questions of data storage and the
right to privacy. Under any work authorization card scheme, some data
storage system would be essential for organization and enforcement.
The staff of the Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, for
example, has developed a plan under which all persons seeking employ-
ment would go to a designated federal office and present documentary
proof of their citizenship, permanent resident status, or other authoriza-
tion to work. Once an applicant's right to work was ascertained, he
would be issued a work authorization card bearing his eligibility identi-
fication number. Prospective employers could telephone the federal of-
fice with the identification number and receive immediate verification
of the job applicant's employment eligibility.91 Although the card
would carry only necessary identification data such as the holder's
name, date of birth, sex, photograph and identifying number, additional
information would be maintained in the data base "to help field person-
nel screen out imposters or persons using a loaned card to establish eligi-
bility."9 2
Privacy issues arise to the extent that individuals are unable to con-
trol the accumulation and use of personal information gathered by the
government. Former Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Cas-
par Weinberger described this type of centralized data storage as a
"double-edged sword":
On the one hand, it can help to assure that decisions about individuals are
made on the basis of accurate, up-to-date information. On the other, it
demands a hard look at the adequacy of our mechanisms for guaranteeing
citizens all the protections of due process in relation to the records we
maintain about them.93
An examination of the current caselaw shows that an informational
right of privacy 94 is not broadly recognized by the courts.95 Although
91 Enforcement Decision Memo No. 1, supra note 2, at 5-6.
92 Id at 8.
93 Weinberger, Foreward to HEW REPORT, supra note 52, at vi.
94 Some authors distinguish between due process privacy and first amendment guaran-
tees:
The relationship between due process privacy and the First Amendment is subtle and
complex. To cite only one example of a case in which the two virtually merge, see Stan-
ley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). They can also come to sword's points. E.g., Rowan
v. Post Office Department, 397.U.S. 728 (1970). In essence they are alike, however, in
that they affirmatively guarantee individual freedoms. The emphasis of each differs.
Under the first amendment the emphasis is on the mind, the spirit and the communica-
tion between persons by means of symbols. Due process privacy emphasizes the body
and the personality as well as the ability to control them and to control information
1981]
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Congress passed a Privacy Act in 1974,96 it has not always been inter-
preted to allow citizens to control the application and dissemination of
information about them. 97 The proposed work authorization card
would further diminish the ability of individuals to control the use of
information about them. 98 Until the courts recognize and enforce an
informational right of privacy, congressional enactment of the work au-
thorization card proposal would be unwise.
Some lower federal courts have, on nonconstitutional grounds, en-
forced an individual's right to have potentially derogatory, inaccurate
records removed from government files and to prevent needless dissemi-
nation of records, however accurate, obtained for one purpose but em-
ployed for another. For example, in Menard v. Saxbe,99 the District of
Columbia Circuit Court interpreted the relevant statute as the basis for
an order that FBI arrest records in cases where probable cause had been
absent should be expunged. Menard relies, however, on a specific statu-
tory provision and hence contributes little to the development of general
principles of informational privacy. 10 0 Constitutional principles are nec-
about them. Both, in their respective spheres, reserve to the individual certain funda-
mental personal liberties.
Note, Due Process Privacy and the Path of Progress, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 469, 471 n.12.
95 See text accompanying notes 99-136 infia.
96 Federal Privacy Act of 1974, 8 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
97 See text accompanying notes 123-27 infra.
98 As one commentator has observed:
[R]ecords are mechanical memories not subject to the erosions of forgetfulness and the
promise of eventual obliteration. The threat of misuse becomes as permanent as the
records themselves. The risks of autonomy multiply not simply because of the height-
ened possibilities of unconsented reproduction and distribution at any given time, but
also because those possibilities, however reduced by regulation, now extend indefinitely
through time. Such a chronic and enduring risk must count as itself an injury.
Gerefy, Redefiing Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233, 288 (1977). Another commen-
tator observed:
True freedom of action exists only when informational privacy rights are respected.
Since acts deny their meaning from their social context, the ability of an actor to exert
some control over who knows what about his behavior is essential for unrestrained ac-
tion. Informational privacy is a necessary context for mental health, individuality and
ethical self-development. The social relations that exist in our society are based on a
respect for informational privacy. Additionally, informational privacy is the policy un-
derlying the specific guarantee of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.
Note, Information Privacy- The Concept, Itr Acceptance and Afect on State Information Practices, 15
WASHBURN L.J. 273, 280 (1976).
99 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
100 Other cases which enforce some kind of right to informational privacy on nonconstitu-
tional grounds include Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (recognized informa-
tional right of privacy as an administrative matter); Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931
(S.D.N.Y. 1975),rev'don othergrounds sub nom. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (as inciden-
tal to other privacy rights). Some tort actions also recognize the right of individuals to exert
some control over personal information. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469
(1975); Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1975); Galella v. Onassis, 487
F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
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essary to constrain abuses of information gathered pursuant to the pro-
posed work authorization card system.
The Supreme Court has not recognized the existence of a constitu-
tional right to privacy. No right of privacy is mentioned in the Consti-
tution.10' The Supreme Court has, however, protected various aspects
of personal privacy by judicial interpretation of the Bill of Rights. 0 2
The Court has recognized a right of privacy as the basis for protecting
the freedom of the individual to practice contraception,1 0 3 to read or
look at pornography in the home, 04 and to have an unwanted preg-
nancy terminated. 10 5 The decision in these cases are clearly rooted in
concerns for personal privacy, but the Supreme Court has articulated its
decisions in terms of previously recognized Bill of Rights guarantees. 10 6
The Supreme Court has never acknowedged a constitutional basis for an
informational right of privacy. 10 7
Three decisions emphasize the Court's unwillingness to recognize
any constitutional protection for an informational right of privacy. 08
The first of these cases, Laird v. Tatum, was decided by the Court in 1972.
In Laird, the respondents challenged the constitutionality of a data-gath-
ering system established by Army Intelligence in response to the Army's
experience in the various civil disorders it was called upon to control in
1967 and 1968 in Detroit. Respondents argued that the existence of this
data-gathering system created a chilling effect on their first amendment
rights. The Court held in a five-to-four decision that the jurisdiction of
a federal court could not be
invoked by a complainant who alleges that the exercise of his First Amend-
ment rights is being chilled by the mere existence, without more, of a govern-
mental investigative and data-gathering activity that is alleged to be
broader in scope than is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of a
101 Only ten states explicitly mention a right to privacy in their constitutions. See ALASKA
CONST. art. I, § 22; ARIZ. CONsT. art. 2, § 8; CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 1; FLA. CONST. art 1,
§ 12; HAwAnI CONST. art. 1, § 6; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 12; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 5; MONT.
CONsT. art. 2, § 10; S.C. CoNsT. art. 1, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. i, § 7.
102 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
103 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (the Court found a right of.marital privacy
within the specific guarantees of the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments).
104 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (the Court held that the first amendment forbade
making the mere possession of obscene materials a crime).
105 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (the Court held that state criminal abortion laws violate the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment which protects the right of privacy against
state action).
106 HEW REPORT, supra note 52, at 34.
107 In Roe v. Wade, the Court announced that only those privacy rights which were "funda-
mental," or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," should be afforded constitutional
protection.




valid governmental purpose. 109
The crux of the Court's holding was that the allegation of a chilling
effect produced by the mere existence of the Army surveillance system
did not state a claim of injury in fact. The federal courts therefore lack-
ed jurisdiction to consider the question of whether the surveillance sys-
tem was constitutionally overbroad." 0
The Court distinguished Laird from other cases which have held
that constitutional violations could arise where a governmental regula-
tion fell short of a direct prohibition against the exercise of first amend-
ment rights, but chilled the exercise of those rights.II' The Court
pointed out that in each of the cases where the chilling effect of a gov-
ernment regulation had constituted a violation of the first amendment,
"the challenged exercise of governmental power was regulatory, pro-
scriptive or compulsory in nature and the complainant was either pres-
ently or prospectively subject to the regulations, proscriptions or
compulsions he was challenging."' 12 In contrast, the Court concluded
that the chilling effect alleged by the complainant in Laird derived from
mere knowledge that the government was engaged in a particular activ-
ity. The Court reasoned that the chilling effect did not arise from the
challenged activity itself, but from the fear that the information gath-
ered could, in the future, be the basis for some "other and additional
action" which could injure the individual. Since the challenged activity
of information-gathering by the Army was not the direct source of the
chilling effect alleged by the complainant, the Court refused to hold this
type of information-gathering unconstitutional. 13 Thus, absent some
use of the information by the Army, the individual knowing such infor-
mation was being accumulated suffered no injury and could make no
constitutional challenge.
The Court emphasized that the primary sources of the information
gathered by the Army were news media and publications of general cir-
culation, field reports from Army Intelligence agents who attended
109 408 U.S. at 10 (emphasis added).
110 Id at 13-16.
111 See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Keyishian v. Board of Re-
gents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
112 408 U.S. at 11.
113 In none of [those] cases. . . did the chilling effect arise merely from the individual's
knowledge that a governmental agency was engaged in certain activities or from the
individual's concomitant fear that, armed with the fruits of those activities, the agency
might in the future take some other and additional action detrimental to the individual.
Rather, in each of [the cases where the chilling effect constituted a violation of the Con-
stitution], the challenged exercise of governmental power was regulatory, proscriptive or
compulsory in nature and the complainant was either presently or prospectively subject
to the regulations, proscriptions or compulsions he was challenging.
Id at 11.
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meetings open to the public, and information provided to the Army by
civilian law enforcement agencies. 114 The Court refused to recognize
that accumulation of public information could be injurious to an indi-
vidual's freedom to exercise first amendment rights.It5 Laird continues
to stand 1 6 "as a barrier to plaintiffs who wish to challenge the simple
accumulation of information, where no unreasonable search has taken
place,"' 7 or no injurious use has been made of the information. 1 8
Under Laird, the holder of a work authorization card would be
without standing to challenge the accumulation of personal information
collected for work authorization card files unless some injurious use was
made of that accumulated information. The work authorization data
bank proposal presents an even more disturbing prospect than that
presented by Laird. In Laird, information was being collected on a par-
ticular set of individuals in Detroit. In contrast, the work authorization
card proposal would cover all lawful workers in America. Furthermore,
the information collected in Laird was not organized in any particular
way, yet in the context of the work authorization data bank, the use of a
numerical identifier would facilitate comparisons between files and pos-
sibly between government agencies. The application of the holding in
Laird to the work authorization data bank is far from satisfactory. Yet
Laird, one of the few cases confronting this issue, still stands as good law.
In 1976, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Miller. 19 In
Miller, the respondent, who had been charged with a variety of federal
offenses, made a pretrial motion to suppress microfilms of checks, de-
posit slips and other records of his accounts at two banks which main-
114 Id at 6. The Court suggests that since these were public sources of the Army's informa-
tion, no unconstitutional search had taken place, presumably because no legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy attaches to these sources of information.
115 The Court's opinion ignored the alleged chilling effect arising from the accumulation of
information about the individual and the individual's awareness that this information is being
accumulated. Instead, the Court seemed to understand the chill as arising from the respon-
dents' views of the proper role of the military in America:
[T~he alleged "chilling" effect may perhaps be seen as arising from respondents' very
perception of the system as inappropriate to the Army's role under our form of govern-
ment, or as arising from respondents' beliefs that it is inherently dangerous for the mili-
tary to be concerned with activities in the civilian sector, or as arising from respondents'
less generalized yet speculative apprehensiveness that the Army may at some future date
misuse the information.
Id at 1-14.
116 Although the Federal Privacy Act of 1974, 8 U.S.C. § 552(a), limits the ability of enti-
ties like the Army to conduct surveillance and data-gathering programs such as those at issue
in Laird, the holding in Laird with respect to an individual's lack of standing to challenge the
accumulation of information about him is still good law.
117 Note, supra note 94, at 256.
118 408 U.S. at 13-15.
119 425 U.S. 435. See Comment, Reasonable Expectatios of Thtvaq in Bank Records: A Reap-
praisal of United States v. Miller andBank Depositor Pr'vacy Rights, 72 J. CRIM. L. & C. 243 (198 1).
1981]
COMMENTS
tained the records pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. He
contended that the subpoenas duces tecum pursuant to which the banks
had produced the material were defective, and that the records had thus
been illegally seized in violation of the fourth amendment. 20 The
Court held that the respondent lacked the fourth amendment interest in
the bank records necessary to challenge the validity of the subpoenas
duces tecum. 2'
The basis of the Court's holding was that there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy in a person's bank records. A person's bank
records consist only of documents conveyed voluntarily by the individ-
ual to the bank and regularly used by the bank's employees in the ordi-
nary course of business. The Court held that no legitimate expectation
of privacy attaches to such documents.' 22 The implication of the
Court's holding is that there are two types of information: information
which is sufficiently confidential to warrant fourth amendment protec-
tion, and information which is not personal enough to merit such pro-
tection. Since the individual "lack[s] any legitimate expectation of
privacy" in his bank records, these receive no fourth amendment protec-
tion.
In both Miller and Laird, the Court upheld the acquisition of infor-
mation sought by the government in part because of its public nature.
In Miller, the information at issue consisted of bank records. In Laird, it
was news media and publications of general circulation, reports on pub-
lic meetings, and information supplied to the Army by local police. In
neither case did the Court restrict the acquisition of information because
of its private character. Although ll//er implies that some information
is protected from government acquisition because of its private nature,
the Court's opinion does not specify the criteria used to differentiate that
information which is confidential and thus protected, from that which is
not. Because Miller failed to draw a bright line between personal infor-
mation and unprotected information, there is currently no limit on the
type of information the government can collect.
In both Mi//er and Laird, the Court emphasized the public nature
of the information sought by the government. In both cases, however,
the Court failed to consider the effect of the accumulation of information
120 425 U.S. 435 at 438-39.
121 d at 439.
122 The checks are not confidential communications, but negotiable instruments to be
used in commercial transactions. All of the documents obtained, including financial
statements and deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks
and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business. The lack of any legiti-
mate expectation of privacy concerning the information kept in bank records was as-
sumed by Congress in enacting the Bank Secrecy Act. ...
Id. at 442.
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on the individual's liberty. As information is accumulated, various facts
can be linked and characteristics of the individual isolated. Accumula-
tion of information is a threat to informational privacy. If the worker
identification number is used by other government agencies, the prob-
lem of accumulation is aggravated by the potential pooling of govern-
ment files with common numbers.
In 1974, Congress adopted the Federal Privacy Act. 123 The Act
safeguards the individual's right to privacy in the records maintained
about him by the federal government. For example, the Act permits an
individual to find out what records are collected and used by an agency,
and to gain access to information pertaining to him in federal agency
records. 124 Congress intended the act to "permit an individual to pre-
vent records pertaining to him obtained by [federal] agencies for a par-
ticular purpose from being used or made available for another purpose
without his consent."' 25 Yet, the Act provides that any agency may dis-
close information to another person or agency for a "routine use."' 126
This routine use provision undermines the protections created by the
Privacy Act. To the extent that the work authorization card proposal
establishes a numerical standard universal identifier for the entire work-
ing population, it will "create an incentive for institutions to pool or link
their records thereby making it possible to bring a lifetime of informa-
tion to bear on any decision about a given individual."' 127 As long as the
disclosure of information can be characterized as routine, the Privacy
Act will not bar the pooling and linking of data files. Nor has the
Supreme Court held that the accumulation of information about an in-
dividual can be a violation of privacy rights. Unless Congress or the
Supreme Court takes a position which limits the ability of agencies to
accumulate and exchange information, the work authorization card
123 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
124 Id § 552a(b)(1), (3).
125 Id Pub. L. 93-579 § 2(b)(2), 88 Stat. 1896 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976)). See a/so
5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (1976).
126 Conditionsr of Disc/osure-No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a
system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency,
except pursuant to a written request by, or prior written consent of, the individual to
whom the record pertains, unless disclosure of the record would be...
(3) For a routine use as defined in subsection (a) (7) of this section and described under
(e)(4) (D) of this section. ...
(a)(7) the term 'routine use' means, with respect to disclosure of a record, the use
of such record for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which it was
collected ...
(e) Ageng Requirements. Each Agency that maintains a system of records shall...
(4) .. .publish in the Federal Register at least annually a notice of the existence
and character of the system of records, which notice shall include...
(D) each routine use of the records maintained in the system.
127 HEW REPORT, sufira note 52, at 111.
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through a numerical identifier could invade the rights of informational
privacy of lawful American workers.
Furthermore, information held in a computer data bank can be
stored permanently. Consequently, the chance for misuse of the infor-
mation gathered under the work authorization plan could become a
permanent risk for the individual. 128 No Supreme Court case has yet
protected the individual's privacy interest against the risks of accumu-
lated information.
In Whalen v. Roe,' 2 9 the Court did, however, recognize an informa-
tional right of privacy. In an unanimous decision, the Court upheld the
state program at issue against the acknowledged privacy claim. The
New York legislature established the program in 1972 in response to a
concern that prescription drugs were being diverted to unlawful uses.
The statute required prescriptions for the most dangerous legitimate
drugs to be prepared on an official form identifying the drug, the dos-
age, and the patient. A copy of the form was to be retained by the state
for five years under a security system designed to prevent public disclo-
sure. 130
The Court recognized that "[t]he mere existence in readily avail-
able form of the information about patients' use of [the most dangerous
legitimate] drugs creates a genuine concern that the information will
become publicly known and that it will adversely affect their reputa-
tions."' 13 1 Concern for this possible stigma led the Court to conclude
that the statute threatened to impair the individual's interest in the non-
disclosure of private information.132 For the first time, the Court recog-
nized that a right to informational privacy could be violated by the
simple existence of accessible information. The Court based its finding
128 See note 98 supra.
129 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
130 The statute classified potentially harmful drugs, and provided that prescriptions for the
category embracing the most dangerous legitimate drugs (Schedule II) be prepared on an
official form. One copy of the form, which required identification of the prescribing physi-
cian, dispensing pharmacy, drug, and dosage, and the patient's name, address, and age, was
to be filed with the State Health Department, where pertinent data are recorded on tapes for
computer processing. All forms are retained for a five-year period under a system to safe-
guard their security, and are thereafter destroyed. Public disclosure of the patient's identity is
prohibited and access to the files is confined to a limited number of health department and
investigatory personnel. Id at 593-95.
131 Id. at 600. The Court's recognition of the need for informational privacy is based on
testimony by two parents that their children would be stigmatized by the state's central filing
system (one child had been taken off his medication as a result); by three adults who feared
that disclosure of their names would result from the central filing of patient identification;
and four physicians who testified that the filing requirement imposes on patients' privacy and
that they had observed a reaction of shock, fear, and concern on the part of their patients
whom they had informed of the plan. Id at 595-96 n.16.
132 Id at 600.
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of the need for informational privacy on the potential for stigma to the
individual that could result if there was disclosure. Consequently, the
Court might not find any need to enforce an informational right to pri-
vacy in situations where there was no risk of stigma to the individual,
and thus the informational right of privacy acknowledged in Whalen v.
Roe might not be applicable to the work authorization card.
Recognizing the possibility of an informational right of privacy, the
Whalen Court nonetheless upheld the state program. In essence, the
Court found that the state statute provided adequate procedural safe-
guards, 133 and that the state's interest in having the program out-
weighed the individual's fear of disclosure. "The state's vital interest in
controlling the distribution of dangerous drugs would support a decision
to experiment with new techniques of control." 134 Although the Court,
in reaching its holding, gave considerable weight to the procedural safe-
guards put in place by the statute and the importance of the state inter-
est in controlling the distribution of drugs, it also referred to the statute
as an experiment. The use of the word "experiment" calls into question
the weight of the state interest necessary to override the individual's
right to informational privacy. The Court's opinion does not clarify this
issue.
The Court concluded its opinion with the statement that it was
"not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of
vast amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or
other massive government files."' 35 Although the Court stressed the de-
pendence of many essential government functions on the government's
right to collect and apply personal information, it also emphasized that
typically the right to collect personal information is regulated by statu-
133 The Court noted the following procedural protections:
The receiving room is surrounded by a lock wire fence and protected by an alarm sys-
tem. The computer tapes containing the prescription data are kept in a locked cabinet.
When the tapes are used, the computer is run "off-line" which means that no terminal
outside of the computer room can read or record any information. Public disclosure of
the identity of patients is expressly prohibited by the statute and by a Department of
Health regulation. Willful violation of these prohibitions is a crime punishable by up to
one year in prison and a $2,000 fine. At the time of trial, there were 17 Department of
Health employees with access to the files; in addition, there were 24 investigators with
authority to investigate cases of overdispensing which might be identified by the com-
puter. Twenty months after the effective date of the Act, the computerized data had
only been used in two investigations involving alleged overuse by specific patients.
Id at 594-95.
134 Id at 598.
135 Id at 605. In the same vein, Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion, said that:
[Als the example of the Fourth Amendment shows, the Constitution puts limits not only
on the type of information the state may gather, but also on the means used to gather it.
The central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the poten-
tial for abuse of that information, and I am not prepared to say that future developments
will not demonstrate the necessity for some curb on technology.
Id at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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tory duties to avoid unwarranted disclosure. 136 Yet, the meaning of this
statement, which seems to indicate a willingness on the part of the Court
to enforce a right of informational privacy, must be taken in the context
of the entire opinion in which the Court only recognized a right of infor-
mational privacy to the extent that disclosure of the information might
bring stigma to individuals on whom records were kept, and in which
the Court held that the state's interest in an experimental program out-
weighed the right of informational privacy. Although the Whalen Court
acknowledged the need for some informational right of privacy, the ef-
fect of the Court's opinion is to minimize the urgency of this privacy
need in order to promote the exercise of the state's police power to col-
lect data on citizens for purposes of its programs.
Thus Whalen v. Roe, which is the strongest statement by the Court
on the existence of a constitutionally protected right of informational
privacy, provides little basis for controlling any intrusions into an indi-
vidual's informational privacy rights caused by the establishment of the
work authorization data system. Until the Supreme Court recognizes
an informational right of privacy, the work authorization data system
should not be established because of the heavy burden it would impose
on an already fragile right.
V. CONCLUSION
For the past decade there has been an extraordinary influx of illegal
immigration into the United States, which shows no signs of abating. A
recent article stated:
In the past ten years, the United States has absorbed more than four mil-
lion immigrants and refugees and perhaps twice that number of illegal
aliens, more new residents than in any decade in its history. If current
immigration and fertility rates remain the same, the nation's population
will double in 100 years.' 3 7
American workers fear that illegal aliens are taking jobs, depriving le-
gally entitled citizens of the opportunity to work, and that illegal aliens
are burdening welfare and other government support programs. The
data, however, is ambiguous, and some economists argue forcefully that
illegal aliens do not displace American workers, but take secondary em-
ployment that American workers typically reject. The same economists
also posit that illegal aliens contribute more to the government revenue
136 The collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare and social security benefits, the
supervision of public health, . . . all require the orderly preservation of information,
much of which is personal in character and potentially harmful or embarrassing if dis-
closed. The right to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically accompa-
nied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures.
Id at 605.
137 N.Y. Times, supra note 1.
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through withholding and sales taxes than they take out in other forms of
social relief. Those economists point out that most illegal aliens are
afraid to take any direct form of government relief for fear of being de-
ported.
The impact of illegal aliens in the United States is not limited to
the economy. The heavy flood of illegal immigration tends to bring so-
cial problems. Most illegal immigrants do not speak English. They are
usually poor and not well educated. A large and growing population
with these characteristics will probably cause severe social strains in
American cities. Although the actual impact of illegal immigrants on
the United States economy is not known, some commentators argue that
the potential social conflicts alone are serious enough to justify consider-
ation of the work authorization card proposals. These commentators
have ignored hard-working habits 138 and low crime rates139 usually at-
tributed to the illegal immigrant population.
Although the rate of illegal immigration is higher than it has ever
been in American history, the social and economic effects of this immi-
gration are not well known because illegal immigrants tend to avoid
contact with the authorities or anyone who might report them. Hence,
their numbers and the effect of their presence are not susceptible of easy
measurement. Yet unless the impact of the illegal aliens is ascertained
with empirical evidence, the establishment of a work authorization card
plan, with its concomitant social costs, would be difficult to justify.
The staff of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee
Policy projects that their proposed plan will cost millions of dollars. For
the call-in or real-time access data bank system, "[t]he non-recurring
design and implementation costs of [the] system are estimated to be $90
million over six years. Annual operations costs total $250 to $310 mil-
lion for the enrollment, verification and data base maintenance func-
tions" for the first seven years.140 For the work authorization card itself,
"Start-up costs would total $50 million to be spent over a six- to seven-
year period on system design and development. This expenditure would
be followed by $40 million spent on hardware. . . . [F]rom the begin-
ning annual operating costs [would be between] $180 and $230 million
... -141 All costs are based on 1981 estimates. Given the magnitude
of these projected expenses, the immigration of illegal aliens must be
shown empirically to cost the country more under current law than will
the projected cost of the work authorization card, before the proposal
can be justified.
138 See note 25 supra.
139 AEI REPORT, sura note 15, at 18.
140 Enforcement Decision Memo No. 1, supra note 2, at 6.
141 Id at 9.
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Another cost which must be considered is the impact the proposal
will have on our diplomatic relations with other countries, particillarly
Mexico. Currently, the United States is trying to cultivate an amicable
relationship with Mexico, because of the large oil reserves there. The
work authorization card proposal would, in theory, discourage poor
Mexicans from coming to the United States. Those individuals would
probably remain in Mexico as unemployed workers, contributing to the
already high unemployment rate. Furthermore, if illegal Mexican
aliens no longer worked in the United States, the indirect foreign aid
sent to Mexico in the form of illegal workers' paychecks would also
cease. Although the actual amount of money sent to Mexico this way
each year is not known, it is substantial and might prove essential to the
continuation of a friendly relationship with Mexico.
The most serious ramification of the work authorization card pro-
posal is its threatened effect on American's rights. Recent caselaw sug-
gests that the work authorization card would seriously undermine the
freedom from searches and seizures and rights to informational privacy.
The current law would give these rights little protection against the
work authorization card.
Under the logic of the driver's license cases, employees would be
vulnerable to searches and seizures in the workplace if they failed to
have an up-to-date work authorization card with them when enforce-
ment authorities checked. This conclusion is dictated by the analysis of
Robinson, Gustafson, and Prouse. In Robinson and Gustafson, the Supreme
Court affirmed the authority of police officers to make full body searches
of legitimately arrested persons, even when the arrest was for driving
with an invalid license, or for failure to carry a driver's license. If en-
forcement officers have the power to arrest employees for working with-
out a valid work authorization card, then by analogy Robinson and
Gustafson would give officers the authority to conduct full body searches
pursuant to those arrests, regardless of whether the arrest was related to
the commission of some other crime, or the arresting officer felt
threatened by the possibility that the worker might be carrying a
weapon.
The third case, Prouse, stated that a police officer need not have
probable cause to stop a motorist to check the validity of his license.
Although a random check is impermissible because it relies on the dis-
cretion of the police officer, the Court did indicate that spot checks
based on neutral, nondiscretionary criteria would be upheld. Applied to
the work authorization card, Prouse would allow a worker to be arrested
for failure to have a valid work authorization card and be subjected to a
full body search. A person never suspected of any criminal behavior
would be vulnerable to an intrusive search if he happened not to have
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his card with him when authorities were checking. In contrast, a worker
currently could not be searched unless he was first arrested on a charge
based on probable cause. Yet, because of the strong analogy between
the driver's license and the proposed work authorization card, if the lat-
ter is established, courts will tend to treat the driver's license cases as
persuasive. Thus, the work authorization card might unjustifiably ex-
tend the permissible scope of searches and seizures.
The proposed card also threatens privacy on a second level. The
use of the work authorization card would necessitate the assignment of
an identification number to each worker and the creation of a data bank
to store relevant information. To the extent that the identification
number and the data bank facilitate the accumulation and comparison
of information about the individual, privacy rights are threatened.
Miller, Laird, and Whalen emphasize the Supreme Court's reluc-
tance to enforce an acknowledged right to informational privacy. In
Miller, although the Court implied that some information is sufficiently
confidential to merit fourth amendment protection while other informa-
tion is not, the Court failed to define the -difference between these two
types of information. As a result, there is no limit on the type of infor-
mation the government can collect. Laird held that the accumulation of
information by government agencies was not unconstitutional. In
reaching its decision, the Court failed to consider that the accumulation
of information facilitates detection of an individual's characteristics. In-
stead, Laird ruled that an individual is not injured by the accumulation
of information, and therefore has no standing to challenge the collection
of information by a government agency until the information is used in
a way injurious to the individual. The Whalen Court recognized a right
to informational privacy, but only to the extent that the accumulation
of information could result in some stigma to the individual if disclosed.
Furthermore, the Whalen Court indicated that the individual interest in
informational privacy could easily be outweighed by the state's need to
collect information, even for an experimental program.
Miller, Laird, and Whalen indicate that there would be practically
no limitation on the ability of the government, through the work au-
thorization card, to collect information about everyone employed in the
United States. Although several government agencies such as the Inter-
nal Revenue Service and the Social Security Administration already ac-
cumulate personal information, the proposed work authorization card
system poses a greater threat to informational privacy. Under the work
authorization card plan, a numerical standard universal identifier
would be established for the entire population. Not even the social se-
curity number has this broad scope. To the extent that other agencies
adopt the same identification system, there will be an incentive for agen-
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cies to pool their data. Furthermore, the work authorization card plan
contemplates the accumulation of information in order to facilitate the
identification of users of counterfeit and borrowed cards. Thus, enfoice-
ment agents and employers who suspect an employee of being an illegal
immigrant will be able to call the data bank for verification of the
holder's identity.' 42 If information stored in the data bank is made
available to employers and enforcement officials, there will always be
the potential for misuse of that information. The United States does not
yet have laws adequate to control the use of accumulated information
necessary for a massive identification system. Without these laws, the
work authorization card system threatens rights to informational pri-
vacy.
The burdens the card would impose should only be justified by the
weightiest of governmental interests. The work authorization card
would be required to insure the fair administration of legislation that
would make it criminal for employers to hire illegal aliens. The avail-
able empirical evidence, however, fails to establish the seriousness of the
impact of illegal aliens and the resulting need for such legislation.
American workers are unemployed and the United States economy is
unstable, but "this temporary recurring social condition" should not be-
come the basis for a remedy which may permanently jeopardize individ-
ual liberties.' 43
ELIZABETH GREENE NOWAKOWSKI
142 Id at 6.
143 Comment, Regulation of Illegal Aliens.- Sanctions Against Employers Who Knowingly Hire Un-
docunented Workers, 4 WAYNE ST. U.L. REV. 41, 62 (1976).
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